The characteristics of moral consciousness are usually examined jointly with normative and value factors. O. G. Drobnitskii justly considers the leading criterion of moral consciousness to be the normative quality of moral judgments, the distinctive characteristic of which consists, in turn, of the impersonal nature of such judgments, and also of the fact that moral consciousness "does not associate its judgments directly to whatever facts may be at hand" . Without entering into a polemic against these assertions, we should like (...) to proceed to deal with a different aspect of the same question. (shrink)

Good and evil are the most general ethical categories from which we can get our bearings in the fundamental philosophical and normative problems of ethics. In the contemporary scholarly literature the interpretation of the good is multifunctional. Good is regarded as a model of morality, as the most general moral requirement or most general moral evaluation, and finally as a practical norm, i.e., a requirement embodied in moral experience, as a unity of the objective and subjective in moral actions. The (...) history of ethical thought was bound to reach this broad, all-embracing conception of the good, indeed, that was the way it went, mastering the content of the category of the good, bit by bit, focusing attention now on one, now on another of its aspects. Hence the most general explanation of the good as a synonym for morality has not at all been the same throughout the different stages in the history of ethical thought. Good, like evil, and like all other ethical categories, had a different compass and different sets of attributes in diverse ethical systems. One must also consider that until modern times, there had never existed a single categorial term to designate morality as a whole. As O. G. Drobnitskii noted, the words "good and evil," "justice," "virtue," and "manners" were often preferred to the concept "morals"; and moreover, each of these words was used to designate not only the particular phenomena within moral philosophy but the entire domain of morals in general. (shrink)

The need for discussion of the question of the structure of ethics, its interrelation with other disciplines, methods of ethics research and, finally, ways of achieving a connection between ethical theory and practice has undoubtedly become urgent.

The proper development of Marxist-Leninist ethics demands thorough analysis of its categories, and clarification of their nature and interconnections. These questions are still inadequately treated in our philosophical literature. The problem of the essence of ethical categories is actually bypassed, yet it is precisely here that one finds many disputes and much that is not clear. This problem requires the solution of questions such as the relationship between existing morality and ethical theory, between actual moral feelings, views and principles on (...) the one hand, and ethical categories on the other. In this article let us focus attention on these questions. (shrink)

The study of ethical categories is a key problem, now posed anew in the context of education for communism. Among recent writings on this subject, much interest attaches to L.M. Arkhangel'skii's article, "The Essence of Ethical Categories" [Sushchnosf eticheskikh kategorii], Filosofskie nauki, 1961, No. 3.* This article discusses the essence of the categories of ethics, their relations with one another and with the principles of morality, and the class content of categories. Particularly valuable, in our opinion, is the author's attempt (...) to analyze categories as concepts expressing universal moral forms, for without this kind of analysis it is impossible to make a rigorously scientific study of the content of categories in concrete historical circumstances. However, certain of the positions taken in his article give cause for objection. (shrink)

In recent years, the pages of our journal have carried a number of discussion articles dealing primarily with one question: the essence of the concept of "ethical category" and the concrete place that each ethical category should occupy in the socio-cultural complex denoted by the terms: morality, morals, ethics. The need for discussion of such questions in our scholarly literature on ethics has long been present. The immediate impetus for opening the discussion was publication of L. M. Arkhangel'skii's interesting and (...) significant monograph, The Categories of Marxist-Leninist Ethics [Kategorii marksistsko-leninskoi etiki], and his article "The Essence of Ethical Categories" [Sushchnost' eticheskikh kategorii], in Filosofskie nauki, 1961, No. 3. These writings indisputably represent a step forward in the study of a number of specific ethical categories. However, both in Arkhangel'skii's definition of the concept of "ethical category" and in his interpretation of that definition, there are, in the opinion of a number of participants in the discussion, spots that are weak both in terms of science and of logic. Arkhangel'skii understands ethical categories as "the principal key concepts of ehtical theory, reflecting the fundamental characteristics of morality in general , constituting social reflection of objectively operative concrete historical criteria of moral evaluation , as well as of requirements presented with respect to moral obligations , moral responsibility , dignity , and moral satisfaction , the content of which is determined by the principles of a given morality". (shrink)

Rescued in 1972 from a storeroom in which rats and seeping water had severely damaged the fifty-year-old manuscript, this text is the earliest major work (1919-1921) of the great Russian philosopher M. M. Bakhtin. Toward a Philosophy of the Act contains the first occurrences of themes that occupied Bakhtin throughout his long career. The topics of authoring, responsibility, self and other, the moral significance of "outsideness," participatory thinking, the implications for the individual subject of having "no-alibi in existence," the difference (...) between the world as experienced in actions and the world as represented in discourse--all are broached here in the heat of discovery. This is the "heart of the heart" of Bakhtin, the center of the dialogue between being and language, the world and mind, "the given" and "the created" that forms the core of Bakhtin's distinctive dialogism. A special feature of this work is Bakhtin's struggle with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Put very simply, this text is an attempt to go beyond Kant's formulation of the ethical imperative. Toward a Philosophy of the Act will be important for scholars across the humanities as they grapple with the increasingly vexed relationship between aesthetics and ethics. (shrink)

The essays assembled here are all very early and differ in a number of ways from Bakhtin's previously published work.

This Book Brings A Clear And Insightful Presentation Of The Wisdom Of Hinduism In All Its Fundamental Principles.

y title links together kings, war, and the economy, and the linkage is deliberate. I do not of course wish to suggest that Hellenistic kings did nothing but fight wars, that they were responsible for all the wars in the period, that royal wars were nothing but a form of economic activity, or that the economy of the kings was dependent purely on the fruits of military success, though there would be an element of truth in all these propositions. But (...) I wish to react against the frequent tendency to separate topics that are related, the tendency to treat notions relating to what kings were or should be as something distinct from what they actually did, and the tendency to treat political and military history on the one hand as something separate from economic and social history on the other. A number of provisos should be made at the outset. The title promises more than the paper can deliver; in particular, more will be said about kings and war than about kings and the economy. The subject is handled at a probably excessive level of generalization and abstraction. I talk about Hellenistic kings in general, but in practice it would obviously be necessary to draw distinctions between different dynasties, different times and places, and individual rulers, and some of those distinctions I shall indicate. Conclusions are provisional and subject to modification and considerable expansion in detail. Finally, two points of terminology. I use the word ‘Hellenistic’ for no better reason than out of the force of acquired habit, but of course the word and the concept are modern inventions that were unknown to the ancient world. (shrink)

My title links together kings, war, and the economy, and the linkage is deliberate. I do not of course wish to suggest that Hellenistic kings did nothing but fight wars, that they were responsible for all the wars in the period, that royal wars were nothing but a form of economic activity, or that the economy of the kings was dependent purely on the fruits of military success, though there would be an element of truth in all these propositions. But (...) I wish to react against the frequent tendency to separate topics that are related, the tendency to treat notions relating to what kings were or should be as something distinct from what they actually did, and the tendency to treat political and military history on the one hand as something separate from economic and social history on the other.A number of provisos should be made at the outset. The title promises more than the paper can deliver; in particular, more will be said about kings and war than about kings and the economy. The subject is handled at a probably excessive level of generalization and abstraction. I talk about Hellenistic kings in general, but in practice it would obviously be necessary to draw distinctions between different dynasties, different times and places, and individual rulers, and some of those distinctions I shall indicate. Conclusions are provisional and subject to modification and considerable expansion in detail. Finally, two points of terminology. I use the word ‘Hellenistic’ for no better reason than out of the force of acquired habit, but of course the word and the concept are modern inventions that were unknown to the ancient world. (shrink)

Incessantly cited by critics, Bakhtin's work none the less remains relatively unavailable: partly through lack of suitable editions, partly because no individual text conveys all the key concepts or arguments. This anthology provides in a convenient format a good selection of the writing by Bakhtin and of that attributed to Voloshinov and Medvedev. It introduces readers to the aspects most relevant to literary and cultural studies and gives a focused sense of Bakhtin's central ideas and the underlying cohesiveness of his (...) thinking. (shrink)

The word ‘tyrant’ was not originally Greek, but borrowed from some eastern language, perhaps in western Asia Minor. On the other hand, tyranny as it developed in the Greek cities in the archaic age would seem to have been initially an indigenous growth, independent of any intervention by foreign powers. It then became a constantly recurring phenomenon of Greek political and social life, so long as the Greeks enjoyed an independent history.

The word ‘tyrant’ was not originally Greek, but borrowed from some eastern language, perhaps in western Asia Minor. On the other hand, tyranny as it developed in the Greek cities in the archaic age would seem to have been initially an indigenous growth, independent of any intervention by foreign powers. It then became a constantly recurring phenomenon of Greek political and social life, so long as the Greeks enjoyed an independent history.